04-25-2019 How can a researcher protect self if the employer decides to have an unfairly low-price sale?

I have this article, " 01-27-2019 (I)How one's intellectual Income is evaluated? (智慧专利收入是如何评估的?)", that talked about how an intellectual property's value is decided. Intellectual property can be a software, a software prototype, a lab-usage solution's recipe, etc. And I said in that article that, once the value of such intellectual asset is evaluated, its academic evaluation price is served as the basis for any further bargain(s) between the research company and possible buyer(s).

So, it is a common sense that there won't be a deal can be reachable if a research company try to sell it for a too high price, but,  what will be the situation if a research company decided to sell the intellectual asset at a price that is too low? It depends on how its stakeholders consider the situation.

Let me try to illustrate what might be the scenario based on my limited MBA knowledge as a complete outsider of such legal matter:

An intellectual property asset has researchers, researching company, and researching company's investors to be called its stakeholders.  If the researching company is a 50%-100% owned child company to its investor-company, this researching company's low-price decision can be effectively & entirely vetoed by its investor-company. If the researching company has an investor-company that has lower than 50% investment share, the researching company can effectively decide to sell the intellectual property asset at a price much lower than its academic evaluation price.

This low price sale decision from the researching company will certainly impact its researchers and its minor investor company's interest in its sale. This is the decisive moment totally depends on how researchers and investor-company think about the situation.

In academic evaluation, researchers contribution has a contribution percentage in its total value, and minor investor-company has its share percentage in the researching company's contribution percentage. So, based on the understanding that a company's free-will decision should only impact on its own contribution share, that researchers and minor investor-company can certainly decide if need call on law enforcing agency's help to protect the fair sale of each's own contribution share. If anyone's the decision is to follow the researching company's low price sale, it would be understood as "give up" that person's own contribution shares in academic evaluation price.

So, if the decision made by impacted stakeholders is to protect a fair price sale, law enforcing agency would step-in to protect. In this case, the academic evaluation price would be the bargain's asking price, the deal price would be the bouncing price that decided upon the possible buyer's price and historic data of price bouncing rate in bargains. Once this fair sale price is decided, each stakeholder's value can be decided according to each's contribution percentage value to the total academic evaluation price. So, all will be protected by laws, that those who refuse to "give up" fair sale opportunity would get the intellectual reward according to the fair sale price,  and those who willing to sell their own contribution share at a very low price would be ensured that the decision is from their own free willingness.

----April 25th, 2019

Popular Posts